The New York Times expos on the US-Ukraine partnership contains no surprises, but the underlying revelation is stunning

Under the title 'The Partnership: The Secret History of the War in Ukraine', The New York Times has published a long expose that has made a splash. It is a long article advertised - with a lumbering clunkiness that betrays cramping politics - as the "untold story of America's hidden role in Ukrainian military operations against Russia's invading armies."

And it clearly aspires to be sensational: a revelation with a whiff of the famousPentagon Papersthat, when leaked to that same New York Times and the Washington Post in 1971, revealed what a mass-murderous fiasco America's Vietnam War really was.

Yet, in reality, this time the New York Times is offering something less impressive by magnitudes. And the issue is not that the Pentagon Papers were longer. What really makes "The Partnership" so underwhelming are two features: It is embarrassingly conformist, reading like a long exercise in rooting for the home team, the US, by access journalism: Based on hundreds of interviews with movers and shakers, this is really the kind of "investigation" that boils down to giving everyone interviewed a platform for justifying themselves as good as they can and as much as they like.

With important exceptions. For the key strategy of exculpation is simple. Once you see through the rather silly group-therapy jargon of a tragic erosion of "trust" and sad misunderstandings, it is the Ukrainians that get the blame for the US not winning its war against Russia, in their country and over their dead bodies.

Because one fundamental conceit of "The Partnership" is that the war could have been won by the West, through Ukraine. What seems to never even have entered the author's mind is the simple fact that this was always an absurd undertaking. Accordingly, the other thing that hardly makes it onto his radar screen is the crucial importance of Russia's political and military actions and reactions.

This, hence, is an article that, in effect, explains losing a war against Russia without ever noticing that this may have happened because the Russians were winning it. In that sense, it stands in a long tradition: Regarding Napoleon's failed campaign of 1812 and Hitler's crash between 1941 and 1945, all too many contemporary and later Western observers have made the same mistake: For them it's always the weather, the roads (or their absence), the timing, and the mistakes of Russia's opponents. Yet it's never - the Russians. This reflects old, persistent, and massive prejudices about Russia that the West cannot let go of. And, in the end, it is always the West which ends up suffering from them the most.

In the case of the Ukraine War, the main scapegoats, in the version of "The Partnership," are now Vladimir Zelensky and his protege and commander-in-chief General Aleksandr Syrsky, but there is room for devastating side swipes at Syrsky's old rival Valery Zaluzhny and a few lesser lights as well.

Perhaps the only Ukrainian officer who looks consistently good in "The Partnership" is Mikhail Zabrodsky, that is, the one - surprise, surprise - who worked most closely with the Americans and even had a knack of flatteringly imitating their Civil War maneuvers. Another, less prominent recipient of condescending praise is General Yury Sodol. He is singled out as an "eager consumer" of American advice who, of course, ends up succeeding where less compliant pupils fail.

Zabrodsky and Sodol may very well be decent officers who do not deserve this offensively patronizing praise. Zelensky, Syrsky, and Zaluzhny certainly deserve plenty of very harsh criticism. Indeed, they deserve being tried. But constructing a stab-in-the-back legend around them, in which Ukrainians get blamed the most for making the US lose a war that the West provoked is perverse. As perverse as the latest attempts by Washington to turn Ukraine into a raw materials colony, as a reward for being such an obedient proxy.

With all its fundamental flaws, there are intriguing details in "The Partnership." They include, for instance, a European intelligence chief openly acknowledging - as early as spring 2022 - that NATO officers had become "part of the kill chain," that is, of killing Russians who they were not, actually, officially at war with.

Or that, contrary to what some believe, Westerners did not overestimate but underestimate Russian abilities from the beginning of the war: In the spring of 2022, Russia rapidly surged "additional forces east and south" in less than three weeks, while American officers had assumed they would need months. In a similar spirit of blinding arrogance, General Christopher Cavoli - in essence, Washington's military viceroy in Europe and a key figure in boosting the war against Russia - felt that Ukrainian troops did not have to be as good as the British and Americans, just better than Russians. Those daft, self-damaging prejudices again.

The New York Times's "untold story" is also extremely predictable. Despite all the detail, nothing in "The Partnership" is surprising, at least nothing important. What this sensationally unsensational investigation really does is confirm what everyone not fully sedated by Western information warfare already knew: In the Ukraine War, Russia has not merely - if that is the word - been fighting Ukraine supported by the West but Ukraine and the West.

Some may think the above is a distinction that doesn't make a difference. But that would be a mistake. Indeed, it's the kind of distinction that can make a to-be-or-not-to-be difference, even on a planetary scale.

That's because Moscow fighting Ukraine, while the latter is receiving Western support, means Russia having to overcome a Western attempt to defeat it by proxy war. But fighting Ukraine and the West means Russia has been at war with an international coalition, whose members have all attacked it directly. And the logical and legitimate response to that would have been to attack them all in return. That scenario would have been called World War Three.

"The Partnership" shows in detail that the West did not merely support Ukraine indirectly. Instead, again and again, it helped not only with intelligence Ukraine could not have gathered on its own but with direct involvement in not only supplying arms but planning campaigns and firing weapons that produced massive Russian casualties. Again, Moscow has said this was the case for a long time. And Moscow was right.

This is why, by the way, the British Telegraph has definitely gotten one thing very wrong in its coverage of "The Partnership": The details of American involvement now revealed are not, actually, "likely to anger the Kremlin." At least, they are not going to make it angrier than before, because Russia is certain to have long known about just how much the US and others - first of all Britain, France, Poland, and the Baltics - have contributed, directly and hands-on, to killing Russians.

Indeed, if there is one most important take-away point from the New York Times proud expose of the extremely unsurprising, then it is that the term "proxy war" is both fundamentally correct and insufficient. On one side, it perfectly fits the relationship between Ukraine and its Western "supporters": The Zelensky regime has sold the country as a whole and hundreds of thousands, if not more, Ukrainian lives to the West. The West has used them to wage war on Russia in pursuit of one overarching geopolitical aim of its own: to inflict a "strategic defeat" on Russia, that is, a permanent demotion to second-rate, de facto non-sovereign status.

The above is not news, except perhaps for the many brainwashed by Western information warriors from historian-turned-war-apostle Tim Snyder to lowlier X agitators with Ukrainian flags and sunflowers in their profiles.

What is also less than stunning but a little more interesting is that, on the other side, the term "proxy war" is still misleadingly benign. The key criterion for a war being by proxy - and not its opposite, which is, of course, direct - is, after all, that major powers using proxies limit themselves to indirect support. It is true thatin theoryand historical practice that does not entirely rule out adding some limited direct action as well.

And yet: In the case of the ongoing Ukraine War, the US and other Western nations - and don't overlook that "The Partnership" hardly addresses all the black ops also conducted by them and their mercenaries - have clearly, blatantly gone beyond proxy war. In reality, the West has been waging war on Russia for years now.

That means that two things are true: The West has almost started World War III. And the reason it has not - not yet, at least - is Moscow's unusual restraint, which, believe it or not, has actually saved the world.

Here's a thought experiment: Imagine the US fighting Canada and Mexico (and maybe Greenland) and learning that Russian officers are crucial in firing devastating mass-casualty strikes at its troops. What do you think would happen? Exactly. And that it has not happened during the Ukraine War is due to Moscow being the adult in the room. This should make you think.

(RT.com)